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Aber so viel ist an sich klar, daß dieser, wie jeder Gegenstand, der unser
Begreifungsvermo¨gen nicht u¨bersteigt, durch einen untersuchenden Geist aufgehellt und
in seinem inneren Zusammenhang mehr oder weniger deutlich gemacht werden kann, und
das allein reicht schon hin, den Begriff der Theorie zu verwirklichen.1
(Carl von Clausewitz: Vom Kriege)
Abstract
This paper investigates the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification process via Monte-
Carlo simulations. The qualifying probabilities are calculated for 102 nations, all
teams except for African and European countries. A reasonable method is proposed
to measure the degree of unfairness, which shows substantial differences between the
FIFA confederations: for example, a South American team could have doubled its
chances by playing in Asia. Using a fixed matchup in the inter-continental play-offs
instead of the current random draw can reduce unfairness by about 10%. The move
of Australia from the Oceanian to the Asian zone is found to increase its probability
of participating in the 2018 FIFA World Cup by 75%. Our results provide important
insights for the confederations on how to reallocate the qualifying berths.
Keywords: OR in sports; simulation; soccer; tournament design; FIFA World Cup
MSC class: 62F07, 68U20
JEL classification number: C44, C63, Z20
* Corresponding author. E-mail: laszlo.csato@sztaki.hu
1 “But so much is evident in itself, that this, like every other subject which does not surpass our powers
of understanding, may be lighted up, and be made more or less plain in its inner relations by an enquiring
mind, and that alone is sufficient to realise the idea of a theory.” (Source: Carl von Clausewitz: On
War, Book 2, Chapter 3—Art or Science of War, translated by Colonel James John Graham, London, N.
Tru¨bner, 1873. http://clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm)
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1 Introduction
The FIFA World Cup, the most prestigious soccer tournament around the world, is followed
by millions of fans. According to Palacios-Huerta (2014), 5% of all the people who ever
lived on the Earth watched the final of the 2010 FIFA World Cup played by the Netherlands
and Spain. Qualification to the FIFA World Cup creates widespread media coverage in the
competing countries (Frawley and Van den Hoven, 2015), and brings significant economic
benefits (Stone and Rod, 2016): for example, each participating teams has received at
least 9.5 million USD in the 2018 FIFA World Cup (FIFA, 2017). Success in soccer can
even help build nations (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020).
Some research has addressed the World Cup qualifiers. Fle´gl (2014) applies Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate the performance of national soccer teams during
the 2014 FIFA World Cup qualification. Stone and Rod (2016) aim to assess the degree to
which the allocation of qualification berths among the six FIFA confederations reflects the
quality of the teams from their specific region, mainly by descriptive statistics. Dura´n et al.
(2017) recommend integer programming to construct schedules for the South American
qualifiers that overcome the main drawbacks of the previous approach. Their proposal has
been unanimously approved by the South American associations to use in the 2018 FIFA
World Cup qualification. Pollard and Armatas (2017) investigate home advantage in the
FIFA World Cup qualification games. Csato´ (2020c) identifies an incentive incompatibility
problem in recent FIFA World Cup qualifications organised for the members of the UEFA
(Union of European Football Associations).
However, the FIFA World Cup qualification process has never been analysed before via
Monte-Carlo simulations in the scientific literature. A possible reason is the complexity of
the qualifying system as will be seen in Section 2. Our paper aims to fill this research gap.
In particular, the probability of qualification to the 2018 FIFA World Cup is quantified
for the 102 nations of the AFC (Asian Football Confederation), CONCACAF (Confed-
eration of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football), CONMEBOL
(South American Football Confederation), and OFC (Oceania Football Confederation) to
answer three questions: (a) Is the qualification process fair in the sense that it provides a
higher chance for a better team both within and between the confederations? (b) Is it
possible to improve fairness without reallocating the qualifying berths? (c) How did the
move of Australia from the OFC to the AFC in 2006 affect the teams?
Our main contributions can be summarised as follows:
1. First in the academic literature, the paper calculates the qualifying probabilities
for the FIFA World Cup.
2. A method is proposed to measure the degree of unfairness. It shows that only
the AFC and CONCACAF qualifiers are somewhat unfair as the FIFA World
Ranking does not coincide with the real strength of the teams. However, there
are substantial differences between the confederations.
3. Using a well-devised fixed matchup in the inter-continental play-offs—a policy
applied in the 2010 FIFA World Cup qualification—instead of the current random
draw can reduce unfairness by about 10%.
4. Australia has increased its probability of playing in the 2018 FIFA World Cup
by 75% as a result of leaving the OFC and joining the AFC. The move has
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been detrimental to the AFC nations, while it has favoured all other countries,
especially New Zealand.
Regarding the structure of the article, Section 2 gives a concise overview of connected
works. The designs of the four FIFA World Cup qualifiers and the inter-confederation
play-offs are described in Section 3. The simulation methodology is detailed in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper makes a contribution to at least three fields: fairness in sports, analysis of FIFA
competitions and rules, and simulation of different tournament designs.
It is a usual assumption to interpret fairness such that (1) stronger players should be
preferred to weaker players; and (2) equal players should be treated equally. Groh et al.
(2012) check which seedings in elimination tournaments satisfy the two properties. Arlegi
and Dimitrov (2020) apply these requirements to different kinds of knockout competitions
and characterise the appropriate structures. Both theoretical (Krumer et al., 2017, 2020;
Sahm, 2019) and empirical (Krumer and Lechner, 2017) investigations show that the
ex-ante winning probabilities in round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric
players may depend on the schedule, which can lead to severe problems in the 2026 FIFA
World Cup (Guyon, 2020). Soccer penalty shootouts seem to be biased towards the first
shooter (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Vandebroek et al.,
2018) but this can be mitigated by a carefully devised mechanism (Anbarcı et al., 2019;
Brams and Ismail, 2018; Csato´, 2020a; Csato´ and Petro´czy, 2020; Palacios-Huerta, 2012).
The knockout bracket of the 2016 UEFA European Championship has created imbalances
among six round-robin groups (Guyon, 2018). The play-offs of the 2020 UEFA European
Championship qualifying tournament may match a higher-ranked team against a stronger
opponent than a lower-ranked team (Csato´, 2020d).
In contrast to the World Cup qualifiers, the FIFA World Cup final tournament games
have been attempted to predict several times. Dyte and Clarke (2000) treat the goals
scored by the teams as independent Poisson variables to simulate the 1998 FIFA World
Cup. Deutsch (2011) wants to judge the impact of the draw in the 2010 World Cup, as
well as to look back and identify surprises, disappointments, and upsets. Groll et al. (2015)
fit and examine two models to forecast the 2014 FIFA World Cup. O’Leary (2017) finds
that the Yahoo crowd was statistically significantly better at predicting the outcomes of
matches in the 2014 World Cup compared to the experts and was similar in performance
to established betting odds.
Further aspects of the FIFA World Cup have also been researched extensively. Jones
(1990) and Rathgeber and Rathgeber (2007) discuss the consequences of the unevenly
distributed draw procedures for the 1990 and 2006 FIFA World Cups, respectively. Scarf
and Yusof (2011) reveal the effect of seeding policy and other design changes on the
progression of competitors in the World Cup final tournament. Guyon (2015) collects
some flaws and criticisms of the World Cup draw system. Laliena and Lo´pez (2019) and
Cea et al. (2020) provide a detailed analysis of group assignment in the FIFA World Cup.
Finally, since historical data usually do not make it possible to calculate the majority
of tournament metrics such as qualifying probabilities, it is necessary to use simulations for
this purpose, especially for evaluating new designs (Scarf et al., 2009). According to Lasek
et al. (2013), the best performing algorithm of ranking systems in soccer is a version of the
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famous Elo rating with respect to accuracy. Baker and McHale (2018) provide time-varying
ratings for international soccer teams. Van Eetvelde and Ley (2019) overview the most
common ranking methods in soccer. Ley et al. (2019) build a ranking reflecting the teams’
current strengths and illustrate its usefulness by examples where the existing rankings fail
to provide enough information or lead to peculiar results. Corona et al. (2019) propose
a Bayesian approach to take into account the uncertainty of parameter estimates in the
underlying match-level forecasting model. Dagaev and Rudyak (2019) evaluate the sporting
effects of the seeding system reforms in the UEFA Champions League, while Csato´ (2019)
compares different designs for the World Men’s Handball Championships. Csato´ (2020b)
shows the unfairness of the qualification for the 2020 UEFA European Championship,
which yields important lessons for sports management (Haugen and Krumer, 2019).
3 The 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
The FIFA World Cup qualification is a series of tournaments to determine the participants
of the FIFA World Cup. Since 1998, the final competition contains 32 teams such that the
host nation receives a guaranteed slot. The number of qualifying berths for the continents
is fixed from 2006 to 2022 as follows:
∙ AFC (Asian Football Confederation): 4.5;
∙ CAF (Confederation of African Football): 5;
∙ CONCACAF (Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Associ-
ation Football): 3.5;
∙ CONMEBOL (South American Football Confederation): 4.5;
∙ OFC (Oceania Football Confederation): 0.5;
∙ UEFA (Union of European Football Associations): 13.
The six confederations organise their own contests. The 0.5 slots represent a place in the
inter-continental play-offs, which is the only interaction between the qualifying tournaments
of the different geographical zones.
The qualifications of all confederations are played in rounds. Each round is designed
either in a knockout format (where two teams play two-legged home-away matches) or in
a round-robin format (where more than two teams play in a single or home-away group).
The rounds are often seeded, that is, the participating countries are divided into the same
number of pots as the number of teams per group—corresponding to two pots in the
knockout format—, and one team from each pot goes to a given group. The traditional
seeding is based on the FIFA World Ranking at a specific date such that, if a pot contains
𝑘 teams, the best 𝑘 teams are in the first pot, the next 𝑘 are in the second pot, and so on.
Our paper focuses on four qualifications, the AFC, the CONCACAF, the CONMEBOL,
and the OFC because (1) contrary to the CAF and UEFA contests, they are connected to
each other; (2) the largest and most successful nation of the OFC, Australia, switched to
the AFC in 2006.
The 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (AFC) contained 46 nations and four rounds.
The starting access list was determined by the FIFA World Ranking of January 2015.
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∙ First round
Format: knockout
Competitors: the 12 lowest-ranked teams (35–46)
Seeding: traditional; based on the FIFA World Ranking of January 2015
∙ Second round
Format: home-away round-robin, 8 groups of five teams each
Competitors: the 34 highest-ranked teams (1–34) + the six winners from the first
round
Seeding: traditional; based on the FIFA World Ranking of April 20152
∙ Third round
Format: home-away round-robin, 2 groups of six teams each
Competitors: the eight group winners and the four best runners-up in the second
round3
Seeding: traditional; based on the FIFA World Ranking of April 2016
The two group winners and the two runners-up qualified to the 2018 FIFA World
Cup.
∙ Fourth round
Format: knockout
Competitors: the third-placed teams from the groups in the third round
Seeding: redundant
The winner advanced to the inter-confederation play-offs.
The 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (CONCACAF) contained 35 nations and five
rounds. The access list was determined by the FIFA World Ranking of August 2014.
∙ First round
Format: knockout
Competitors: the 14 lowest-ranked teams (22–35)
Seeding: traditional; based on the FIFA World Ranking of August 2014
∙ Second round
Format: knockout
Competitors: the teams ranked 9–21 in the access list + the seven winners from
the first round
Seeding: the teams of pot 5 (ranked 9–15) were drawn against the teams of pot 6
(the winners from the first round) and the teams of pot 3 (ranked 16–18) were
drawn against the teams of pot 4 (ranked 19–21); based on the FIFA World
Ranking of August 2014
∙ Third round
Format: knockout
Competitors: the teams ranked 7–8 in the access list + the 10 winners from the
second round
Seeding: traditional; based on the FIFA World Ranking of August 2014
2 Since the seeding order differed from the ranking in the AFC entrant list, three winners in the first
round (India, Timor-Leste, Bhutan) were not seeded in the weakest pot 5.
3 Because Indonesia was disqualified by the FIFA, Group F in the second round consisted of only four
teams. Therefore, the matches played against the fifth-placed team were disregarded in the comparison of
the runners-up.
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∙ Fourth round
Format: home-away round-robin, 3 groups of four teams each
Competitors: the teams ranked 1–6 in the access list + the six winners from the
third round
Seeding: pot 1 (teams ranked 1–3), pot 2 (teams ranked 4–6), pot 3 (the winners
from the third round) such that each group contained a team from pot 1, a team
from pot 2, and two teams from pot 3; based on the FIFA World Ranking of
August 2014
∙ Fifth round
Format: home-away round-robin, one group of six teams
Competitors: the group winners and the runners-up in the fourth round
Seeding: redundant
The top three teams qualified to the 2018 FIFA World Cup, and the fourth-placed
team advanced to the inter-confederation play-offs.
The 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (CONMEBOL) contained 10 nations and one
round. It was organised as a home-away round-robin contest. The top four teams qualified
to the 2018 FIFA World Cup, and the fifth-placed team advanced to the inter-confederation
play-offs.
The 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (OFC) contained 11 nations and four rounds.
∙ First round
Format: single round-robin, one group organised in a country (Tonga was chosen
later)
Competitors: the four lowest-ranked teams (8–11), based on FIFA World Ranking
and sporting reasons
Seeding: redundant
∙ Second round
Format: single round-robin, 2 groups of four teams each
Competitors: the seven strongest teams (1–7) + the group winner in the first
round
Seeding: traditional; based on the FIFA World Ranking of July 2015
∙ Third round
Format: home-away round-robin, 2 groups of six teams each
Competitors: the top three teams from each group in the second round
Seeding: pot 1 (2016 OFC Nations Cup finalists), pot 2 (2016 OFC Nations Cup
semifinalists), pot 3 (third-placed teams in the second round) such that each
group contained one team from pots 1–3 each4
∙ Fourth round
Format: knockout
Competitors: the group winners in the third round
Seeding: redundant
The winner advanced to the inter-confederation play-offs.
4 The group stage of the 2016 OFC Nations Cup served as the second round of the 2018 FIFA World
Cup qualification (OFC). The group winners and the runners-up from different groups were matched in
the semifinals of the 2016 OFC Nations Cup.
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The inter-confederation play-offs were contested by four teams from the four confeder-
ations (AFC, CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, OFC), and were played in a knockout format.
The four nations were drawn randomly into two pairs without seeding. The two winners
qualified to the 2018 FIFA World Cup. The inter-confederation play-offs of the 2006 FIFA
World Cup and the 2014 FIFA World Cup qualification were also drawn randomly. This
policy will be followed in the 2022 FIFA World Cup, too. However, FIFA fixed the ties in
the inter-continental play-offs of the 2010 FIFA World Cup qualification as AFC vs. OFC
and CONCACAF vs. CONMEBOL to pair teams being in closer time zones.5
4 Methodology and implementation
In order to quantify some particular tournament metrics of the FIFA World Cup qualifica-
tion, it is necessary to use a simulation technique because historical data are limited: the
national teams do not play many matches in a year. Such a model should be based on
predicting the result of individual games. For this purpose, the strengths of the teams are
measured by the World Football Elo Ratings, available at the website eloratings.net.
Elo ratings consider the results of previous matches but the same result is worth more
when the opponent is stronger. Furthermore, playing new games decreases the weight of
previous matches. Since there is no official Elo rating for national teams, this approach
can be implemented in several ways. For instance, while the official FIFA World Ranking
adopted the Elo method of calculation after the 2018 FIFA World Cup (FIFA, 2018a,b),
it does not contain any adjustment for home or away games. However, this has been
presented to be a crucial factor in international soccer, even though its influence appears
to be narrowing (Baker and McHale, 2018). The World Football Elo Ratings takes into
account some soccer-specific parameters such as the margin of victory, home advantage,
and the tournament where the match was played. Elo-inspired methods are usually good in
forecasting (Lasek et al., 2013), and have been widely used in academic research (Hvattum
and Arntzen, 2010; Lasek et al., 2016; Cea et al., 2020).
In the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification, three types of matches were played: group
matches in a home-away format, single group matches on a neutral field (only in the first
and the second rounds in the OFC zone), and home-away knockout matches. For group
matches, the win expectancy can be directly obtained from the formula of Elo rating
according to the system of World Football Elo Ratings (see http://eloratings.net/about):
𝑊 𝑒𝑅𝑅 =
1
1 + 10−𝑑/400 , (1)
where 𝑑 equals the difference in the Elo ratings of the two teams, and the home advantage
is fixed at 100.
On the other hand, in knockout clashes, the teams focus primarily on advancing to the
next round rather than winning one match. Therefore, we have followed the solution of
the Club Elo rating (see http://clubelo.com/System), and such two-legged matches are
considered as one long match with a corresponding increase in the difference between the
strengths of the teams:
𝑊 𝑒𝐾𝑂 =
1
1 + 10−
√
2𝑑/400
. (2)
5 Similarly, FIFA matched a randomly drawn UEFA runner-up with the AFC team, and two nations
from CONMEBOL and OFC in the two inter-continental play-offs of the 2002 FIFAWorld Cup qualification.
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The Elo ratings are dynamic but we have fixed them for the sake of simplicity. In each
of the four confederations, the ratings of all teams on the day before the first match of the
relevant qualification and the last day of the inter-confederation play-offs (15 November
2015) have been averaged. Four tables in the Appendix show the corresponding measures
of strength: Table A.1 for the 35 CONCACAF teams; Table A.2 for the 46 AFC teams;
Table A.3 for the 10 CONMEBOL teams; and Table A.4 for the 11 OFC teams.
On the basis of formulas (1) and (2), each individual game can be simulated repeatedly.
In particular, the win probability 𝑤𝑖 of team 𝑖 is determined for a match played by teams
𝑖 and 𝑗. Then a random number 𝑟 is drawn uniformly between 0 and 1, team 𝑖 wins if
𝑟 < 𝑤𝑖, and team 𝑗 wins otherwise. Thus draws are not allowed, and group rankings can
be calculated by simply counting the number of wins. Ties in the group rankings are
broken randomly.
Our computer code closely follows the rules of the qualification process described
in Section 3. The only exception is that the AFC qualification updated the ranking of
the teams before the seeding in each round, which is disregarded because the results of
matches played already during the qualification may affect the subsequent rounds due
to this regime. Hence the FIFA World Ranking of January 2015 is used to rank the 12
weakest Asian teams, and the FIFA World Ranking of April 2015 is used to rank the 34
strongest Asian teams.
Finally, the move of Australia from the OFC to the AFC will also be evaluated.
Therefore, an alternative design of the qualification should be chosen with Australia
being in the OFC instead of the AFC. Since then there are only 45 countries in Asia,
a straightforward format would be to organise the first knockout round with the 10
lowest-ranked teams (36–45), while the second round is contested by the 35 highest-ranked
teams (1–35) plus the five winners from the first round. Together with Australia, the OFC
qualification contains 12 teams. Fortunately, the design of the 2006 FIFA World Cup
qualification (OFC) can be adopted without any changes:
∙ First round
Format: single round-robin, 2 groups of five teams each, held in a country
Competitors: the 10 lowest-ranked teams, that is, all nations except for Australia
and New Zealand
Seeding: traditional6
∙ Second round
Format: single round-robin, one group of six teams
Competitors: the two highest-ranked teams (Australia, New Zealand) + the group
winners and the runners-up in the first round
Seeding: redundant
∙ Third round
Format: knockout
Competitors: the group winner and the runner-up in the second round
Seeding: redundant
The winner advanced to the inter-confederation play-offs.
In the first round, the FIFA World Ranking of July 2015 has been used for seeding,
similarly to the second round of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (OFC).
6 This is only a reasonable conjecture as we have not found the official regulation.
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All theoretical model is only as good as its assumptions, thus it is worth summarising
the main limitations here:
∙ The strength of the teams is exogenously given and fixed during the whole
qualification process.
∙ Goal difference is not accounted for in any stage of the qualification.
∙ Draws are not allowed, which is not in line with the rules of soccer.
∙ Home advantage does not differ between the confederations despite the findings
of Pollard and Armatas (2017). However, the influence of the corresponding
parameter is minimal since all matches are played both home and away except
for Oceania, where some games are hosted by a randomly drawn country.
∙ The efforts of the teams do not change even if they have already qualified as a
group winner.
Our numerical results are primarily for comparative purposes. Consequently, the direction
of changes in the tournament metrics after a design modification is more reliable than, for
example, the computed probability of qualification for the FIFA World Cup.
Each simulation has been carried out with 10 million independent runs. A further
increase does not reduce statistical errors considerably, and this would be a futile exercise
anyway in the view of the above model limitations.
5 Results
The three main research questions, presented in the introduction, will be discussed in
separate subsections.
5.1 Quantifying unfairness
Figure 1 shows the probability of qualification as the function of the Elo rating. Unsurpris-
ingly, the simple round-robin format of the CONMEBOL qualification guarantees that this
tournament metric depends monotonically on the strength of the teams. The structure
of the OFC qualification does not necessarily satisfy the fairness condition but it still
holds because only the four weakest teams should play in the first round and the FIFA
ranking underlying the seeding in the second round almost coincides with the ranking by
Elo points (see Table A.4).
On the other hand, some unfairness can be seen in the AFC and CONCACAF qualific-
ation tournaments. Regarding Asia:
∙ Iraq (ranked 8th; Elo 1535.5; qualifying probability: 10.3%) has about 1.4 per-
centage points higher chance to qualify compared to Syria (ranked 15th; Elo:
1544.5; qualifying probability: 8.9%);
∙ Bahrain (ranked 13th; Elo: 1442.5; qualifying probability: 1.22%) has about 0.43
percentage points higher chance to qualify than North Korea (ranked 25th; Elo:
1450; qualifying probability: 0.79%).7
7 The simulation also reveals a robust difference between Turkmenistan (ranked 27th; Elo: 1257) and
Vietnam (ranked 14th; Elo: 1253.5) but both teams can qualify with less than 0.01% probability.
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Figure 1: The probability of qualification for the 2018 FIFA World Cup
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The seeding procedure is responsible for both differences are since the teams with a
marginally smaller Elo can play against weaker opponents on average as they are drawn
from a stronger pot. Two similar cases exist in the CONCACAF zone:
∙ Canada (ranked 9th; Elo 1515.5; qualifying probability: 3.4%) has about 0.52
percentage points higher chance to qualify compared to Guatemala (ranked 15th;
Elo: 1525; qualifying probability: 2.87%);
∙ Trinidad and Tobago (ranked 6th; Elo: 1472; qualifying probability: 2.1%) has
about 0.65 percentage points higher chance to qualify than El Salvador (ranked
13th; Elo: 1482; qualifying probability: 1.45%).8
While the first issue can be entirely attributed to the seeding procedure, the second
anomaly occurs mainly because Trinidad and Tobago was a bye in both the second and
third rounds, where El Salvador had to play.
The degree of unfairness can be quantified by ranking the teams according to their Elo
rating and summing the differences of qualifying probabilities that do not fall into line
with this ranking. Formally, our measure of unfairness 𝑈𝐹 is defined as:
𝑈𝐹 =
∑︁
Elo(𝑖)≥Elo(𝑗)
max{0; 𝑝(𝑗)− 𝑝(𝑖)}, (3)
where Elo(𝑖) and 𝑝(𝑖) are the Elo rating and the probability of qualification for team 𝑖,
respectively. Formula (3) only considers the ordinal strength of the teams but note that
8 The simulation also reveals a robust difference between Suriname (ranked 14th; Elo: 1244.5) and
the Dominican Republic (ranked 12th; Elo: 1242.5) but both teams can qualify with less than 0.01%
probability.
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Table 1: The level of unfairness within the confederations and the seeding regime
Confederation FIFA World Ranking Elo ranking
AFC 0.0186 0.0000005
CONCACAF 0.0118 0.0000002
CONMEBOL 0 0
OFC 0 0
Table 2: Qualifying probabilities when Peru is moved to another confederation
Team Original Peru plays in
confederation AFC CONCACAF CONMEBOL OFC
Iran AFC 0.143 0.853 0.852 0.837
Costa Rica CONCACAF 0.896 0.269 0.895 0.877
Peru CONMEBOL 0.952 0.939 0.416 0.666
New Zealand OFC 0.158 0.156 0.155 0.000
it is unjustified to prescribe how the differences in Elo rating should be converted into
differences in qualifying probabilities. Furthermore, while the above metric depends on
the number of teams as well as the number of slots available, this is not a problem when
both of these variables are fixed.
In order to assess whether the unfairness within a confederation is caused by the
misaligned design of its qualification or merely by the difference between the FIFA World
Ranking and the assumed strength of the teams, we have computed formula (3) both under
the original ranking of the teams and a hypothetical one when they are ordered according
to their true abilities. As Table 1 reveals, the tournaments of all confederations are
constructed fairly, the negligible numbers in the third column for AFC and CONCACAF
are only due to the stochastic nature of the simulation, which leads to unreliable qualifying
probabilities for weak teams.
Unfairness has another dimension, that is, between the confederations. In order to
investigate this issue, Peru (the 6th strongest in CONMEBOL, Elo: 1844.5) has been
exchanged sequentially with somewhat weaker teams in the other three confederations:
Iran (the strongest in AFC, Elo: 1762), Costa Rica (the second strongest in CONCACAF,
ELo: 1805.5), and New Zealand (the strongest in OFC, Elo: 1520.5). These countries are
highlighted in Figure 1.
Table 2 reports the probabilities of qualification for these nations if Peru would play
in various confederations. According to the numbers in the diagonal, each team is the
worst off when it should contest in the CONMEBOL qualifiers. On the other hand, the
chance of Peru to play in the 2018 FIFA World Cup would more than double by playing in
the AFC or CONCACAF zone. Compared to these options, being a member of the OFC
would be less beneficial for Peru due to the lack of a direct qualification slot. Its effect
can be seen in the qualifying probabilities of Iran and Costa Rica, too: since Peru would
qualify with more than 96% probability from the OFC qualifiers to the inter-confederation
play-offs, the two teams would have a larger probability to face Peru there, which would
reduce their chances to advance to the World Cup finals.
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Table 3: Unfairness and the draw for the play-offs
(a) The overall level of unfairness and the seeding regime
Seeding in the qualifiers Draw policy for the play-offs
Random Close Fair
FIFA World Ranking 14.54 13.30 12.35
Elo ranking 14.39 16.18 13.12
(b) The qualifying probabilities of certain teams
Team Confederation Draw policy for the play-offs
Random Close Fair
Australia AFC 0.765 0.798 0.768
Iran AFC 0.852 0.876 0.856
Costa Rica CONCACAF 0.895 0.859 0.903
Peru CONMEBOL 0.416 0.402 0.436
New Zealand OFC 0.155 0.216 0.046
5.2 A reasonable improvement of fairness
The straightforward solution to handle unfairness between the confederations is to reallocate
the slots available for them. However, the current allocation system lacks any statistical
validation, it does not ensure the qualification of the best teams in the world and does not
reflect the number of teams per federation (Stone and Rod, 2016). The process is far from
being transparent and is mainly determined by political, cultural, and historical factors.
Consequently, operations research has a limited role to influence this allocation.
On the other hand, the matching in the two inter-confederation play-offs is clearly
a variable to be chosen by the FIFA executives who are responsible for the tournament
design, as illustrated by the two policies used recently (see the last paragraph of Section 3).
We have considered three possibilities:
∙ Random draw for the play-offs: the four participants from the confederations
AFC, CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, and OFC are drawn randomly into two pairs;
∙ Close draw for the play-offs: the four participants are paired such that AFC vs.
OFC and CONCACAF vs. CONMEBOL;
∙ Fair draw for the play-offs: the four participants are paired such that AFC vs.
CONCACAF and CONMEBOL vs. OFC.
The random draw has been used in the 2006 FIFA World Cup qualification, as well
as since the 2014 FIFA World Cup qualifiers. The close draw has been used in the 2010
FIFA World Cup qualification competition: it pairs nations from closer time zones, which
allows for better kick-off times, can be optimal for the players and may maximise gate
revenue and the value of television rights. Finally, the fair draw is inspired by Figure 1 and
Table 2 as the CONMEBOL team is usually the strongest and the OFC team is usually
the weakest in the play-offs.
The draws for the play-offs are compared in Table 3, the measure of unfairness
𝑈𝐹 (formula (3)) is presented in Table 3.a, while Table 3.b provides the probability of
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Figure 2: The effect of improving the fairness of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
via modifying the draw for inter-confederation play-offs
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The difference in the qualifying probability (under fair draw minus under random draw)
qualification for some countries. Intuitively, the fair draw is the closest to fairness but the
order of random and close draws depends on the seeding applied in the qualifiers of the
confederations. The close draw mostly favours AFC and OFC, however, it is detrimental
to the CONCACAF and CONMEBOL members.
The effect of a fair draw is detailed in Figure 2 for the teams with at least 0.1 percentage
points change in the probability of qualification to the 2018 FIFA World Cup. Compared
to the current random design, all South American countries would be better off, and the
strongest AFC and CONCACAF countries are also preferred. On the other hand, all
nations of the OFC, in particular, the dominating New Zealand would lose substantially
from this reform. The gains are distributed more equally because there is no such a
prominent team in the other zones. Some weak AFC and CONCACAF members are worse
off due to the impossibility of playing against New Zealand in the inter-confederation
play-offs.
5.3 Counterfactual: was it favourable for Australia to join the
AFC?
The FIFA president Sepp Blatter had promised a full slot to the OFC as part of his
re-election campaign in November 2002 but the suggestion was reconsidered in June 2003
13
Figure 3: The effect of Australia being a member of the AFC
on the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
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(ABC, 2003). Subsequently, the largest and most successful nation of the OFC, Australia,
left to join the AFC in 2006. It raises an interesting issue of how this move has affected
the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification.
First, the unfairness measure 𝑈𝐹 would be 15.95 with Australia playing in the OFC,
which corresponds to an increase of almost 10%. The action of Australia has been
favourable for the fairness of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification. The magnitude of
the improvement is similar to the proposed reform of the draw for the inter-confederation
play-offs.
Second, the probabilities of qualification have been computed if Australia would have
remained in the OFC. Figure 3 plots the effects for the national teams facing a change of
at least 0.1 percentage points. Notably, Australia has increased the probability of playing
in the 2018 FIFA World Cup from 44% to 76% by leaving the OFC for the AFC. The
move has also been favourable for New Zealand, which is now the strongest OFC team
and has more than 70% chance to grab the slot guaranteed in the play-offs for Oceania.
All CONCACAF and CONMEBOL members have been better off due to the reduction in
the expected strength of the countries contesting in the play-offs. However, all original
AFC nations have lost with the entrance of Australia, especially those teams that are only
marginally weaker than Australia.
14
6 Conclusions
We have analysed four tournament series of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification via
Monte-Carlo simulations. Their design does not suffer from serious problems but the
CONCACAF competition can be criticised for the great role attributed to the FIFA World
Ranking. Perhaps it is not only a coincidence that this confederation has fundamentally
restructured its qualifying tournament for the 2022 FIFA World Cup (CONCACAF,
2019). On the other hand, there are substantial differences between the chances of nations
playing in different continents: Peru would have doubled its probability of qualification
by competing in the AFC or CONCACAF zone, while New Zealand would have lost any
prospect of participation by being a member of CONMEBOL. Australia is found to have
greatly benefited from leaving the OFC for the AFC in 2006.
Probably first in the literature, a reasonable measure of unfairness has been proposed
to quantify to which extent are weaker teams preferred over stronger teams. A simple
modification in the design of the inter-confederation play-offs can reduce this metric by
about 10%, which shall be seriously considered by FIFA.
Hopefully, our paper will become only the first attempt of academic researchers to
simulate the qualification to the soccer World Cup. There remains huge scope for improving
the model, especially concerning the prediction of individual matches. The results might be
useful for sports governing bodies: we believe that FIFA could further increase the economic
success of World Cups by using a more transparent and statistically validated method
in the allocation of qualifying berths and the design of confederation-level qualification
tournaments.
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Appendix
Table A.1: CONCACAF nations participating in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
The countries are ranked according to the FIFA World Ranking of August 2014. The first match in the
first round was played on 22 March 2015.
The team(s) written in bold (italics) qualified for the 2018 FIFA World Cup (inter-confederation play-offs).
Country Elo rating
21 March 2015 15 November 2017 Average
Costa Rica 1866 1745 1805.5
Mexico 1893 1849 1871
United States 1816 1752 1784
Honduras 1539 1610 1574.5
Panama 1706 1671 1688.5
Trinidad and Tobago 1525 1419 1472
Jamaica 1522 1565 1543.5
Haiti 1446 1495 1470.5
Canada 1507 1524 1515.5
Cuba 1396 1309 1352.5
Aruba 941 919 930
Dominican Republic 1235 1250 1242.5
El Salvador 1507 1457 1482
Suriname 1244 1245 1244.5
Guatemala 1539 1511 1525
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1162 1101 1131.5
Saint Lucia 1132 1098 1115
Grenada 1158 1115 1136.5
Antigua and Barbuda 1271 1203 1237
Guyana 1221 1196 1208.5
Puerto Rico 1059 1028 1043.5
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1204 1252 1228
Belize 1138 1159 1148.5
Montserrat 619 634 626.5
Dominica 951 1005 978
Barbados 1155 1138 1146.5
Bermuda 1210 1198 1204
Nicaragua 1105 1267 1186
Turks and Caicos Islands 776 763 769.5
Curacao 1087 1268 1177.5
U.S. Virgin Islands 679 722 700.5
Bahamas 933 906 919.5
Cayman Islands 937 950 943.5
British Virgin Islands 612 607 609.5
Anguilla 575 558 566.5
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Table A.2: AFC nations participating in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
The countries are ranked according to the FIFA World Ranking of January 2015 (35–46) and April 2015
(1–34). The first match in the first round was played on 12 March 2015.
The team(s) written in bold (italics) qualified for the 2018 FIFA World Cup (inter-confederation play-offs).
Country Elo rating
11 March 2015 15 November 2017 Average
Iran 1724 1800 1762
Japan 1757 1744 1750.5
South Korea 1736 1711 1723.5
Australia 1727 1727 1727
United Arab Emirates 1666 1538 1602
Uzbekistan 1625 1610 1617.5
China 1606 1571 1588.5
Iraq 1509 1562 1535.5
Saudi Arabia 1474 1594 1534
Oman 1522 1457 1489.5
Qatar 1525 1487 1506
Jordan 1503 1482 1492.5
Bahrain 1487 1398 1442.5
Vietnam 1236 1271 1253.5
Syria 1478 1611 1544.5
Kuwait 1446 1461 1453.5
Afghanistan 1084 1150 1117
Philippines 1225 1225 1225
Palestine 1274 1401 1337.5
Maldives 1068 939 1003.5
Thailand 1363 1406 1384.5
Tajikistan 1262 1214 1238
Lebanon 1403 1451 1427
Kyrgyzstan 1100 1208 1154
North Korea 1446 1454 1450
Myanmar 1062 1093 1077.5
Turkmenistan 1261 1253 1257
Indonesia 1207 1228 1217.5
Singapore 1173 1058 1115.5
Malaysia 1225 1063 1144
Hong Kong 1152 1190 1171
Bangladesh 952 803 877.5
Guam 806 833 819.5
Laos 837 785 811
India 1068 1159 1113.5
Sri Lanka 829 688 758.5
Yemen 1211 1224 1217.5
Cambodia 717 811 764
Chinese Taipei 795 925 860
Timor-Leste 639 615 627
Nepal 883 898 890.5
Macau 636 677 656.5
Pakistan 943 946 944.5
Mongolia 734 652 693
Brunei 606 624 615
Bhutan 521 592 556.5
20
Table A.3: CONMEBOL nations participating in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
The countries are ranked according to the FIFA World Ranking of October 2015. The first matchday was
8 October 2015.
The team(s) written in bold (italics) qualified for the 2018 FIFA World Cup (inter-confederation play-offs).
Country Elo rating
7 October 2015 15 November 2017 Average
Argentina 2067 1984 2025.5
Colombia 1999 1926 1962.5
Brazil 2048 2114 2081
Chile 1977 1860 1918.5
Uruguay 1873 1866 1869.5
Ecuador 1822 1747 1784.5
Peru 1807 1882 1844.5
Paraguay 1696 1753 1724.5
Bolivia 1636 1707 1671.5
Venezuela 1668 1738 1703
Table A.4: OFC nations participating in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification
The countries are ranked according to the FIFA World Ranking of July 2015, separately for the positions
1–7 (byes in the first round) and 8–11 (playing in the first round). The first match in the first round was
played on 31 August 2015.
The team written in italics qualified for the inter-confederation play-offs of the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
Country Elo rating
30 August 2015 15 November 2017 Average
New Zealand 1516 1525 1520.5
New Caledonia 1357 1332 1344.5
Tahiti 1226 1220 1223
Solomon Islands 1175 1178 1176.5
Vanuatu 1174 1193 1183.5
Fiji 1281 1214 1247.5
Papua New Guinea 1053 1092 1072.5
Samoa 681 693 687
Tonga 684 564 624
American Samoa 381 463 422
Cook Islands 675 687 681
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